Credible Persuasion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lin, Xiao; Liu, Ce
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/728745
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2228-2273
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; information disclosure; COMMUNICATION

摘要

We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the credibility of a disclosure policy is equivalent to a cyclical monotonicity condition on the policy's induced distribution over states and actions. We also characterize how credibility restricts the sender's ability to persuade under different payoff structures. In particular, when the sender's payoff is state independent, all disclosure policies are credible. We apply our results to the market for lemons and show that no useful information can be credibly disclosed by the seller.