DISCRETION IN HIRING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoffman, Mitchell; Kahn, Lisa B.; Li, Danielle
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjx042
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 765-800
• 关键词: firms; job; ORGANIZATIONS; authority; referrals

摘要

Job-testing technologies enable firms to rely less on human judgment when making hiring decisions. Placing more weight on test scores may improve hiring decisions by reducing the influence of human bias or mistakes but may also lead firms to forgo the potentially valuable private information of their managers. We study the introduction of job testing across 15 firms employing low-skilled service sector workers. When faced with similar applicant pools, we find that managers who appear to hire against test recommendations end up with worse average hires. This suggests that managers often overrule test recommendations because they are biased or mistaken, not only because they have superior private information.