Persuasion for the Long Run

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Best, James; Quigley, Daniel
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/727282
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1740-1791
• 关键词: Repeated games; INFORMATION; reputation; EFFICIENCY; DESIGN

摘要

We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of short-run receivers, who observe some record of feedback about past accuracy. When all feedback is public (as is standard in repeated games), persuasion frequently requires inefficient on-path punishment-even if accuracy is monitored perfectly. If instead the record publishes coarse summary statistics (as is common online), any communication equilibrium the sender prefers to one-shot cheap talk-including Bayesian persuasion-can be supported without cost.