THE ENVIRONMENTAL BIAS OF TRADE POLICY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shapiro, Joseph S.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa042
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 831-886
• 关键词: INTERNATIONAL-TRADE; TARIFF PROTECTION; pollution; MARKET; COMPETITION; TECHNOLOGY; models

摘要

This article describes a new fact, then analyzes its causes and consequences: in most countries, import tariffs and nontariff barriers are substantially lower on dirty than on clean industries, where an industry's dirtiness is defined as its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per dollar of output. This difference in trade policy creates a global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions in internationally traded goods and contributes to climate change. This global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions totals several hundred billion dollars annually. The greater protection of downstream industries, which are relatively clean, substantially accounts for this pattern. The downstream pattern can be explained by theories where industries lobby for low tariffs on their inputs but final consumers are poorly organized. A quantitative general equilibrium model suggests that if countries applied similar trade policies to clean and dirty goods, global CO2 emissions would decrease and global real income would change little.