Contiguous Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Urgun, Can; Yariv, Leeat
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/732889
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 522-567
• 关键词: GOAL-GRADIENT HYPOTHESIS; ECONOMICS; TRIAL; price

摘要

We provide a framework for analyzing search across correlated samples. The agent-a mineral prospecting team, a drug company, a politician-tracks observations over a Brownian path. The agent chooses the search speed and retrospectively picks the best observation when deciding to complete the search. We show that the optimal search speed is U-shaped: it is highest when approaching a breakthrough or when nearing search termination. Unlike search across independent samples, search optimally stops when observations are sufficiently discouraging, following a drawdown stopping boundary. We also show the tractability and features of optimal search contracts in our setting.