Sorting with Teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boerma, Job; Tsyvinski, Aleh; Zimin, Alexander P.
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/732891
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 421-454
• 关键词: MONGE SOLUTIONS; ORGANIZATION; assignment; INEQUALITY; KNOWLEDGE; hierarchies; models

摘要

We fully solve a sorting problem with heterogeneous firms and multiple heterogeneous workers whose skills are imperfect substitutes. We show that optimal sorting, which we call mixed and countermonotonic, is comprised of two regions. In the first region, mediocre firms sort with mediocre workers and coworkers such that the output losses are equal across all these teams (mixing). In the second region, a high-skill worker sorts with low-skill coworkers and a high-productivity firm (countermonotonicity). We characterize the equilibrium wages and firm values. Quantitatively, our model can generate the dispersion of earnings within and across US firms.