WHO GETS A SECOND CHANCE? EFFECTIVENESS AND EQUITY IN SUPERVISION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rose, Evan K.
• 署名单位: Microsoft
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa046
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1199-1253
• 关键词: identification; models; regression; DISCRETION; outcomes; IMPACT; prison; RACE

摘要

Most convicted offenders serve their sentences under community supervision at home instead of in prison. Under supervision, however, a technical rule violation, such as not paying fees, can result in incarceration. Rule violations account for 25% of prison admissions nationally and are significantly more common among black offenders. I test whether technical rules are effective tools for identifying likely reoffenders and deterring crime and examine their disparate racial impacts using administrative data from North Carolina. Analysis of a 2011 reform reducing prison punishments for technical violations on probation reveals that 40% of rule breakers would go on to commit crimes if spared harsh punishment. The same reform also closed a 33% black-white gap in incarceration rates without substantially increasing the black-white reoffending gap. These effects combined imply that technical rules target riskier probationers overall but disproportionately affect low-risk black offenders. To justify black probationers' higher violation rate on efficiency grounds, their crimes must be roughly twice as socially costly as that of white probationers. Exploiting the repeat spell nature of the North Carolina data, I estimate a semiparametric competing risks model that allows me to distinguish the effects of particular types of technical rules from unobserved probationer heterogeneity. Rules related to the payment of fees and fines, which are common in many states, are ineffective in tagging likely reoffenders and drive differential effects by race. These findings illustrate the potentially large influence of ostensibly race-neutral policies on racial disparities in the justice system.