RATIONAL GROUPTHINK

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harel, Matan; Mossel, Elchanan; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa026
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 621-668
• 关键词: Information aggregation; percolation

摘要

We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each others' actions. With normal signals, a group of any size learns more slowly than just four agents who directly observe each others' private signals in each period. Similar results apply to general signal structures. We identify rational groupthink-in which agents ignore their private signals and choose the same action for long periods of time-as the cause of this failure of information aggregation.