Improving Management Through Worker Evaluations: Evidence from Auto Manufacturing*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, Jing; Wang, Shing-Yi
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjac019
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2459-2497
• 关键词: executive-compensation; feedback; incentives; performance; CONTRACTS; gift; pay

摘要

Using a randomized experiment with an automobile manufacturing firm in China, we measure the effects of letting workers evaluate their managers on worker and firm outcomes. In the treatment teams, workers evaluate their managers monthly. We find that providing feedback leads to significant reductions in worker turnover and increases in team-level productivity. In addition, workers report higher levels of happiness and well-being. The evidence suggests that these results are driven by learning by managers, leading to changes in their behavior and an overall better relationship between managers and workers.