Competing Models*

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Montiel Olea, Jose Luis; Ortoleva, Pietro; Pai, Mallesh M.; Prat, Andrea
署名单位:
Cornell University; Princeton University; Rice University; Columbia University
刊物名称:
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0033-5533
DOI:
10.1093/qje/qjac015
发表日期:
2022
页码:
2419-2457
关键词:
Common prior overconfidence INFORMATION equilibrium agreement fragility beliefs MARKET TRADE RISK
摘要:
Different agents need to make a prediction. They observe identical data, but have different models: they predict using different explanatory variables. We study which agent believes they have the best predictive ability-as measured by the smallest subjective posterior mean squared prediction error-and show how it depends on the sample size. With small samples, we present results suggesting it is an agent using a low-dimensional model. With large samples, it is generally an agent with a high-dimensional model, possibly including irrelevant variables, but never excluding relevant ones. We apply our results to characterize the winning model in an auction of productive assets, to argue that entrepreneurs and investors with simple models will be overrepresented in new sectors, and to understand the proliferation of factors that explain the cross-sectional variation of expected stock returns in the asset-pricing literature.
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