Teacher Labor Market Policy and the Theory of the Second Best*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bates, Michael; Dinerstein, Michael; Johnston, Andrew C.; Sorkin, Isaac
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Riverside; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Merced; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjae042
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1417-1469
• 关键词: quality; schools; preferences; mobility; impacts; FIRMS

摘要

We estimate a matching model of teachers and elementary schools with rich data on teachers' applications and principals' ratings from a large, urban district in North Carolina. Both teachers' and principals' preferences deviate from those that would maximize the achievement of economically disadvantaged students: teachers prefer schools with fewer disadvantaged students, and principals' ratings are weakly related to teacher effectiveness. In equilibrium, these two deviations combine to produce a surprisingly equitable current allocation, where teacher quality is balanced across advantaged and disadvantaged students. To close achievement gaps, policies that address deviations on one side alone are ineffective or harmful, while policies that address both could substantially increase the achievement of disadvantaged students.