The Union Threat

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Taschereau-Dumouchel, Mathieu
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa027
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2859-2892
• 关键词: wage inequality; unionization; search; EFFICIENCY; BEHAVIOR; impacts; COSTS; FIRMS

摘要

This article develops a search theory of labour unions in which the possibility of unionization distorts the behaviour of non-union firms. In the model, unions arise endogenously through a majority election within firms. As union wages are set through a collective bargaining process, unionization compresses wages and lowers profits. To prevent unionization, non-union firms over-hire high-skill workers-who vote against the union-and under-hire low-skill workers-who vote in its favour. As a consequence of this distortion in hiring, firms that are threatened by unionization hire fewer workers, produce less and pay a more concentrated distribution of wages. In the calibrated economy, the threat of unionization has a significant negative impact on aggregate output, but it also reduces wage inequality.