Checklists and Worker Behavior: A Field Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jackson, C. Kirabo; Schneider, Henry S.
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20140044
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 136-168
• 关键词: Moral hazard; incentive contracts; safety checklists; performance pay; HEALTH; inference; QUALITY

摘要

We analyze data from a field experiment in which an auto repair firm provided checklists to mechanics and monitored their use. Revenue was 20 percent higher during the experiment, and the effect is equivalent to that of a 1.6 percentage point (10 percent) commission increase. Checklists appear to boost productivity by serving both as a memory aid and a monitoring technology. Despite the large benefits to the firm, mechanics did not use checklists without the firm directly monitoring their use. We show that a moral hazard can explain why mechanics do not otherwise adopt checklists.