Do Fiscal Rules Matter?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grembi, Veronica; Nannicini, Tommaso; Troiano, Ugo
• 署名单位: Copenhagen Business School; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20150076
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1-30
• 关键词: regression discontinuity designs; budget deficits; POLICY; GOVERNMENT; institutions; ACCOUNTABILITY; politicians; benefits; taxation; taxes

摘要

Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters are older.