Does Merger Simulation Work? Evidence from the Swedish Analgesics Market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bjornerstedt, Jonas; Verboven, Frank
• 署名单位: KU Leuven; KU Leuven
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20130034
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 125-164
• 关键词: discrete-choice models; product differentiation; airline industry; consumer demand; performance; prices; POLICY; COMPETITION; POWER

摘要

We analyze a large merger in the Swedish market for analgesics (painkillers). The merging firms raised prices by 40 percent, and some outsiders raised prices by more than 10 percent. We confront these changes with predictions from a merger simulation model. With basic supply side assumptions, the models correctly or moderately underpredict the merging firms' price increase. However, they predict a larger price increase for the smaller firm, which was not the case in practice, and they underpredict the outsiders' responses. We consider several supply side explanations: a plausible cost increase after the merger and the possibility of partial collusion.