Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Asher, Sam; Novosad, Paul
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20150512
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 229-273
• 关键词: regression discontinuity designs; public-goods; close races; MARKET; connections; performance; COMPETITION; CORRUPTION; GOVERNMENT; ELECTIONS

摘要

Political favoritism affects the allocation of government resources, but is it consequential for growth? Using a close election regression discontinuity design and data from India, we measure the local economic impact of being represented by a politician in the ruling party. Favoritism leads to higher private sector employment, higher share prices (Onus, and increased output as measured by night lights; the three effects are similar and economically substantive. Finally, we present evidence that politicians influence firms primarily through control over the implementation of regulation.