The Distortionary Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence from China's Death Ceiling Program

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fisman, Raymond; Wang, Yongxiang
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20160008
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 202-218
• 关键词: design; decentralization; statistics; CONTRACTS

摘要

We study a 2004 program designed to motivate Chinese bureaucrats to reduce accidental deaths. Each province received a set of death ceilings that, if exceeded, would impede government officials' promotions. For each category of accidental deaths, we observe a sharp discontinuity in reported deaths at the ceiling, suggestive of manipulation. Provinces with safety incentives for municipal officials experienced larger declines in accidental deaths, suggesting complementarities between incentives at different levels of government. While realized accidental deaths predict the following year's ceiling, we observe no evidence that provinces manipulate deaths upward to avoid ratchet effects in the setting of death ceilings.