Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anukriti, S.
• 署名单位: Boston College; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20150234
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 27-57
• 关键词: Son preference; Missing girls; gender bias; INDIA; decline; korea; country; CHINA; women; asia

摘要

Can financial incentives resolve the fertility-sex ratio trade-off faced by countries with persistent son preference and easy access to sex-selection technology? An Indian program, Devi Rupak, that seeks to lower fertility and the sex ratio is unable to do so. Although fertility decreases, the sex ratio at birth worsens as high son preference families are unwilling to forgo a son despite substantially higher benefits for a daughter Thus, financial incentives may only play a limited role in the resolution of the ility-sex ratio conflict.