Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Campante, Filipe R.; Quoc-Anh Do; Guimaraes, Bernardo
• 署名单位: Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20170111
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 298-337
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; institutions; variables; origins; TRADE

摘要

We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory)-exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.