Soft Commitments, Reminders, and Academic Performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Himmler, Oliver; Jaeckle, Robert; Weinschenk, Philipp
• 署名单位: University of Erfurt; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20170288
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 114-142
• 关键词: Behavioral economics; monetary incentives; self-control; procrastination; promises; achievement; motivation; education; deadlines

摘要

We provide first evidence that a soft commitment device enhances progress in education and, more generally, improves the completion of complex tasks-such as passing exams. In our field experiment, students can sign a nonbinding agreement and commit to staying on track for graduation. We find that those who were offered the soft commitment device are more likely to sign up for, take part in, and pass exams. A pure reminder treatment does not change behavior, which suggests that the effects are not driven by increased salience. We also show that procrastinators benefit most from the commitment device. (JEL C93, D12, D91, I23)