Cooperation in Polygynous Households

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barr, Abigail; Dekker, Marleen; Janssens, Wendy; Kebede, Bereket; Kramer, Berber
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; Leiden University - Excl LUMC; Leiden University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20170438
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 266-283
• 关键词: agricultural production; risk-factor; EFFICIENCY; allocation; decisions; spouses; HEALTH; IMPACT

摘要

Using a carefully designed series of public goods games, we compare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willingness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household gains. Compared to monogamous husbands and wives, polygynous husbands and wives are less cooperative, one with another, and co-wives are least cooperative, one with another. The husbands' and wives' behavior in a corresponding series of inter-household games indicates that these differences cannot be attributed to selection of less cooperative people into polygyny. Finally, behavior in polygynous households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic. (JEL C93, D13, J12, O12)