Crafting Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Patent Assertion Entities, Litigation, and Innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feng, Josh; Jaravel, Xavier
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20180361
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 140-181
• 关键词: impacts; trolls

摘要

We show that examiner-driven variation in patent rights leads to quantitatively large impacts on several patent outcomes, including patent value, citations, and litigation. Notably, Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) overwhelmingly purchase patents granted by lenient examiners. These examiners issue patents that are more likely to be litigated by both PAEs and conventional companies, and that also have higher invalidity rates. PAEs leverage a specific friction in the patent system that stems from lenient examiners and affects litigation more broadly. These patterns indicate that there is much at stake during patent examination, contradicting the influential rational ignorance view of the patent office.