Best Prices: Price Discrimination and Consumer Substitution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chevalier, Judith A.; Kashyap, Anil K.
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; Bank of England
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150362
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 126-159
• 关键词: Sales; MODEL; BEHAVIOR; demand; output

摘要

This paper proposes a method for aggregating prices when retailers use periodic sales to price-discriminate amongst heterogeneous customers. In the motivating model, loyal customers buy one brand and do not strategically time purchases, while Bargain Hunters always pay the lowest price available, the best price. In the model, the best price is part of an exact price index. Accounting for the best price also substantially improves the empirical match between conventional price aggregation strategies and actual prices paid by consumers. The methodology improves inflation measurement while imposing little burden on the data-collection agency.