Peer Preferences, School Competition, and the Effects of Public School Choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barseghyan, Levon; Clark, Damon; Coate, Stephen
• 署名单位: Cornell University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170484
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 124-158
• 关键词: equilibrium; vouchers

摘要

This paper develops a new economic model of public school choice. The key innovation is to model competition between schools in an environment in which parents have peer preferences. The analysis yields three main findings. First, peer preferences dampen schools' incentives to exert effort in response to competitive pressure. Second, when peer preferences are sufficiently strong, choice can reduce social welfare. This is because choice is costly to exercise but aggregate peer quality is fixed. Third, given strong peer preferences, choice can reduce school quality in more affluent neighborhoods. We conclude that peer preferences weaken the case for choice.