Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Deshpande, Manasi; Li, Yue
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180076
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 213-248
• 关键词: take-up; PARTICIPATION; insurance; impacts; welfare

摘要

We study the effect of application costs on the targeting of disability programs. We identify these effects using the closings of Social Security Administration field offices, which provide assistance with filing disability applications. Closings lead to a persistent 16 percent decline in the number of disability recipients in surrounding areas, with the largest effects for applicants with moderately severe conditions and low education levels. Disability applications fall by only 10 percent, implying that the closings reduce targeting efficiency based on current eligibility standards. Increased congestion at neighboring offices appears more important as a channel than higher travel or information costs.