Sustaining Honesty in Public Service: The Role of Selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barfort, Sebastian; Harmon, Nikolaj A.; Hjorth, Frederik; Olsen, Asmus Leth
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170688
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 96-123
• 关键词: health sector evidence; financial incentives; self-selection; CORRUPTION; dishonesty; MODEL; lies

摘要

We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining honesty in the public sector Focusing on the world's least corrupt country, Denmark, we use a survey experiment to document strong self-selection of more honest individuals into public service. This result differs sharply from existing findings from more corrupt settings. Differences in pro-social versus pecuniary motivation appear central to the observed selection pattern. Dishonest individuals are more pecuniarily motivated and self-select out of public service into higher-paying private sector jobs. Accordingly, we find that increasing public sector wages would attract more dishonest candidates to public service in Denmark.