Inefficient Water Pricing and Incentives for Conservation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chakravorty, U. J. J. A. Y. A. N. T.; Dar, Manzoor h.; Emerick, K. Y. L. E.
• 署名单位: Tufts University; CGIAR; International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid-Tropics (ICRISAT); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20210011
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 319-350
• 关键词: randomized-controlled-trial; induced innovation; Health products; short-run; irrigation; adoption; inference; QUALITY; POLICY

摘要

Farmers often buy water using fixed fees-rather than with marginal prices. We use two randomized controlled trials in Bangladesh to study the relationship between marginal prices, adoption of a water-saving technology, and water usage. Our first experiment shows that the technology only saves water when farmers face marginal prices. Our second experiment finds that an encouragement to voluntarily convert to hourly pumping charges does not save water. Taken together, efforts to conserve water work best when farmers face marginal prices, but simply giving an option for marginal pricing is insufficient to trigger water-saving investments and reduce irrigation demands. (JEL O13, Q12, Q15, Q16, Q25)