Does Discipline Decrease Police Misconduct? Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegationst

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rozema, Kyle; Schanzenbach, Max
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20200568
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 80-116
• 关键词: deterrence

摘要

Reformers are calling for greater oversight of police behavior, in part through enhanced use of civilian complaints. However, oth-ers counter that greater oversight could chill effective policing. We assess police officer response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sus-tained allegation reduces that officer's future misconduct. We find no evidence that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assign-ment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement. We conclude that our findings are most consistent with improved officer conduct, in part from oversight and officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments. (JEL H76, J45, K42, M54)