The Long-Run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lovenheim, Michael F.; Willen, Alexander
• 署名单位: Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170570
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 292-324
• 关键词: relative earnings; School quality; labor-market; unions; education; outcomes; IMPACT; COMPENSATION; performance; EMPLOYMENT

摘要

We analyze how exposure to teacher collective bargaining affects long-run outcomes for students, exploiting the timing of state duty-to-bargain law passage in a cross-cohort difference-in-difference framework. Among men, exposure to a duty-to-bargain law in the first 10 years after passage depresses annual earnings by $2,134 (3.93 percent), decreases weekly hours worked by 0.42, and reduces employment and labor force participation. The earnings estimate implies that current duty-to-bargain laws reduce earnings by $213.8 billion annually. Effects grow with time since law passage, are largest among nonwhites, and are not evident for women. Duty-to-bargain laws reduce male noncognitive skills, supporting the labor market findings.