The Employee Costs of Corporate Debarment in Public Procurement†

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Szerman, C. H. R. I. S. T. I. A. N. E.
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20200669
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 411-441
• 关键词: trade liberalization; earnings losses; CORRUPTION; politicians; SANCTIONS; audits

摘要

This paper studies an anticorruption policy-corporate debarment, or blacklisting-to understand how disclosing illicit corporate practices and the sanctions for these practices affect firm and worker outcomes. Exploiting a policy change in Brazil that imposed stricter penalties for corrupt firms, I find that debarment is associated with a sizable decline in employment and an increase in the probability of exiting the formal sector. I also document that workers' annual earnings fall after debarment. The impacts are driven by lost revenues from government contracts. The results shed light on the costs to workers in weighing the consequences of corruption crackdown. (JEL D73, E26, H57, H83, J31, K42, O17)