Casting a Wider Tax Net: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brockmeyer, Anne; Smith, Spencer; Hernandez, Marco; Kettle, Stewart
• 署名单位: The World Bank; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160589
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 55-87
• 关键词: Field experiments; ENFORCEMENT; audit; deterrence; taxation; FIRMS

摘要

The majority of firms in developing countries are informal, yet even among registered firms, tax filing rates are low. We argue that non-filing of taxes among registered firms constitutes an important intermediate form of informality, which can be tackled cost-effectively. Using a randomized experiment in Costa Rica, we show that credible enforcement emails increased the tax payment rate (amount) by 3.4 p.p. (US$15) among previously non-filing firms. Emails that highlight third-party reports of a firm's transactions further increased compliance. The effect persisted over two years, and treated firms became more likely to report transactions with other firms, facilitating future tax enforcement.