New Evidence on Information Disclosure through Restaurant Hygiene Grading

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ho, Daniel E.; Ashwood, Zoe C.; Handan-Nader, Cassandra
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Princeton University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180230
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 404-428
• 关键词: salmonella-enteritidis; report cards; infections; incentives; california; POLICY; RISK

摘要

The case of restaurant hygiene grading occupies a central role in information disclosure scholarship. Comparing Los Angeles, which enacted grading in 1998, with California from 1995-1999, Jin and Leslie (2003) found that grading reduced foodborne illness hospitalizations by 20 percent. Expanding hospitalization data and collecting new data on mandatorily reported illnesses, we show that this finding does not hold up under improvements to the original data and methodology. The largest salmonella outbreak in state history hit Southern California before Los Angeles implemented grading. Placebo tests detect the same treatment effects for Southern California counties, none of which changed restaurant grading.