How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Watzinger, Martin; Fackler, Thomas A.; Nagler, Markus; Schnitzer, Monika
• 署名单位: University of Munich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 328-359
• 关键词: intellectual property-rights; patents; COMPETITION; KNOWLEDGE; FIRMS

摘要

Is compulsory licensing an effective antitrust remedy to increase innovation? To answer this question, we analyze the 1956 consent decree that settled an antitrust lawsuit against Bell, a vertically integrated monopolist charged with foreclosing the telecommunications equipment market. Bell was forced to license all its existing patents royalty-free, including those not related to telecommunications. We identify the effect of the consent decree on follow-on innovations building on Bell patents by using exactly matched non-Bell patents as control group. We show that the consent decree led to a lasting increase in innovation but only in markets outside the telecommunications sector.