Where Do Students Go When For-Profit Colleges Lose Federal Aid?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cellini, Stephanie E.; Darolia, Rajeev; Turner, Lesley J.
• 署名单位: George Washington University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Kentucky; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180265
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 46-83
• 关键词: higher-education; labor-market; financial-aid; crowd-out; COSTS; PRIVATE; subsidies; earnings; schools; tuition

摘要

We examine the effects of federal sanctions imposed on for-profit institutions in the 1990s. Using county-level variation in the timing and magnitude of sanctions linked to student loan default rates, we estimate that sanctioned for-profits experience a 68 percent decrease in annual enrollment following sanction receipt. Enrollment losses due to for-profit sanctions are 60-70 percent offset by increased enrollment within local community colleges, where students are less likely to default on federal student loans. Conversely, for-profit sanctions decrease enrollment in local unsanctioned for-profit competitors, likely due to improved information about local options and reputational spillovers. Overall, market enrollment declines by 2 percent.