Informed Enforcement: Lessons from Pollution Monitoring in China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Axbard, Sebastian; Deng, Zichen
• 署名单位: University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Amsterdam; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20210386
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 213-252
• 关键词: air-pollution; environmental-regulations; political-economy; water-pollution; incentives; CORRUPTION; PRODUCTIVITY; manipulation; progress; HEALTH

摘要

Government regulations are often imperfectly enforced by public officials. In this study, we exploit the introduction of air pollution monitors in China to investigate whether real-time monitoring of policy outcomes affects the enforcement of existing regulations. Using assignment criteria established by the central government and new georeferenced data on local enforcement activities, we show that monitoring (i) increases enforcement against local firms, (ii) improves the targeting of enforcement, and (iii) reduces aggregate pollution. These effects are driven by officials facing performance incentives and are stronger when there is limited scope for data manipulation, suggesting that real-time monitoring improves top -down accountability. (JEL K32, L51, O13, P25, P28, Q52, Q53)