Salary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agan, Amanda Y.; Cowgill, Bo; Gee, Laura K.
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Columbia University; Tufts University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20230365
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 380-413
• 关键词: disclosure laws; MARKET; DISCRIMINATION

摘要

We study how salary disclosures affect employer demand using afield experiment featuring hundreds of recruiters evaluating over 2,000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary questions and the candidates'disclosures for male and female applicants. Our findings suggest that extra dollars disclosed yield higher salary offers, willingness to pay, and perceptions of outside options by recruiters (all similarly for men and women). Recruiters make negative inferences about the quality and bargaining positions of nondisclosing candidates, though they penalize silent women less. (JEL C93, D82, J22, J23, J31)