Can Development Programs Counter Insurgencies? Evidence from a Field Experiment in AfghanistanIndian Rupee

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Beath, Andrew; Christia, Fotini; Enikolopov, Ruben
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); ICREA; Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20230150
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 80-116
• 关键词: development aid; Development assistance; civil-war; CONFLICT; VIOLENCE; support; counterinsurgency; randomization; DYNAMICS; wartime

摘要

We exploit a randomized controlled trial conducted between 2007 and 2011 to identify the effect of Afghanistan's largest local governance and development program on the strength of the insurgency. We find that the program reduced violence, improved economic outcomes, and increased government support in interior regions of the country, but increased violence in villages close to the Pakistani border, where foreign insurgents were more numerous. The results suggest that development programs can be effective in suppressing locally driven insurgencies, but may be counterproductive where insurgents are not reliant on the local population for support. (JEL C93, D74, F35, O15, O17, O18)