Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mattsson, Martin
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20230672
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 414-445
• 关键词: performance; incentives; motivation; selection; INDIA; pay

摘要

Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low-and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11 percent but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase. (JEL D73, D83, H83, O17)