Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnston, Andrew C.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Merced
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20210763
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 310-346
• 关键词: public-school teachers; performance pay; student-achievement; labor-market; class size; QUALITY; education; differentials; earnings; MODEL

摘要

I examine teacher preferences using a discrete-choice experiment linked to data on teacher effectiveness. I estimate willingness to pay for a rich set of compensation elements and working conditions. Highly effective teachers usually have the same preferences as their peers, but they have stronger preferences for performance pay. I use the preference estimates to investigate the optimal compensation structure for three key objectives: maximizing teacher utility, maximizing teacher retention, and maximizing student achievement. Under each objective, schools underutilize salary and performance pay while overutilizing retirement benefits. Restructuring compensation can significantly improve both teacher welfare and student achievement. (JEL H75, I21, J31, J32, J45, J81)