Depreciating Licenses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Weyl, E. Glen; Zhang, Anthony Lee
• 署名单位: Microsoft; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200426
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 422-448
• 关键词: PROPERTY-RIGHTS; transaction costs; market power; auctions; incentives; EFFICIENCY; itqs

摘要

Many governments assign use licenses for natural resources, such as radio spectrum, fishing rights, and mineral extraction rights, through auctions or other market-like mechanisms. License design affects resource users' investment incentives as well as the efficiency of asset allocation. No existing license design achieves first-best outcomes on both dimensions. Long-term licenses give owners high investment incentives but impede reallocation to high-valued entrants. Short-term licenses improve allocative efficiency but discourage investment. We propose a simple new mechanism, the depreciating license, and we argue that it navigates this trade-off more effectively than existing license designs.