Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Samuel; Persson, Petra
• 署名单位: Santa Clara University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180622
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 87-127
• 关键词: law-enforcement; Sex work; MARKET; demand; HEALTH; IMPACT; RISK

摘要

Certain markets are illicit because part of the supply is coerced, but little is known about the optimal regulation of such markets. We model a prostitution market with voluntary and coerced prostitutes and ask what regulation can restore the benchmark outcome that would arise under laissez-faire absent coercion. Whereas current policies-decriminalization, criminalization of the buy or sell sides, and licensing-are ineffective against trafficking or harm voluntary suppliers, we show that an alternative policy can restore the benchmark outcome. Our results are relevant to the ongoing debate about decriminalizing prostitution and provide guidance for empirical work on prostitution regulation.