Reducing Frictions in College Admissions: Evidence from the Common Application

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Knight, Brian; Schiff, Nathan
• 署名单位: Brown University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190694
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 179-206
• 关键词: quality

摘要

College admissions in the United States are decentralized, creating frictions that limit student choice. We study the Common Application (CA) platform, under which students submit a single application to member schools, potentially reducing frictions and increasing student choice. The CA increases the number of applications received by schools, reflecting a reduction in frictions, and reduces the yield on accepted students, reflecting increased choice. The CA increases out-of-state enrollment, especially from other CA states, consistent with network effects. Entry into the CA changes the composition of students, with evidence of more racial diversity and more high-income students and imprecise evidence of increases in SAT scores.