School Boards and Education Production: Evidence from Randomized Ballot Order†

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shi, Ying; Singleton, John D.
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200435
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 438-472
• 关键词: candidate name-order; teachers unions; corporate governance; independent directors; industry expertise; experience; IMPACT; POLICY; REPRESENTATION; performance

摘要

We examine the causal influence of educators elected to the school board on local education production. The key empirical challenge is that school board composition is endogenously determined through the electoral process. To overcome this, we develop a novel research design that leverages California's randomized assignment of the order that candidate names appear on election ballots. We find that an additional educator elected to the school board reduces charter schooling and increases teacher salaries in the school district rela-tive to other board members. We interpret these findings as consistent with educator board members shifting bargaining in favor of teach-ers' unions. (JEL D72, H75, I21, J31, J45, J51)