Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mueller, Karsten
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200626
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 295-322
• 关键词: government-owned banks; business cycles; POLITICS; INDEPENDENCE; uncertainty; ELECTIONS; policies; credit

摘要

Do politics matter for macroprudential policies? I show that changes in macroprudential regulation exhibit a predictable electoral cycle in the run-up to 221 elections across 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Policies restricting mortgages and consumer credit are system-atically looser before elections, particularly during economic expan-sions. Consistent with theories of opportunistic political cycles, this pattern is stronger when election outcomes are uncertain, regulators are closely tied to politicians, and institutions are poor. These results suggest that political pressures may limit the ability of regulators to lean against the wind.