Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De Walque, Damien; Valente, Christine
• 署名单位: The World Bank; University of Bristol
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210202
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 256-285
• 关键词: Conditional cash transfers; improving education; randomization; absences

摘要

Many countries use CCTs targeted to parents to promote schooling. Attendance conditions may work through two channels: incentiviza-tion and information. If children have private information, (i) pro-viding attendance information to parents may increase attendance inexpensively relative to CCTs and (ii) it may be more effective to incentivize children, who have full information, than parents. Tackling both questions in a unified experimental setting, we find that information alone improves parental monitoring and has a large effect relative to our CCT. Incentivizing children is at least as effec-tive as incentivizing parents--importantly, not because parents were able to appropriate transfers to children. (JEL D82, D83, I21, I22, I28, L31, O15)