Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo
• 署名单位: Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay; Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); National University of La Plata; University of Nottingham; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200321
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 110-153
• 关键词: PROSPECT-THEORY; ENFORCEMENT; probability; income; RISK; pay; perceptions; JUDGMENT; SALIENCE; taxation

摘要

The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and ben-efits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with a tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small-and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than US$200 million in taxes per year. We find that providing information about audits significantly affected tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972).