Profiting from Most-Favored-Customer Procurement Rules: Evidence from Medicaidt

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feng, Josh; Hwang, Thomas; Maini, Luca
• 署名单位: Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Harvard University; Harvard University Medical Affiliates; Brigham & Women's Hospital; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200688
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 166-197
• 关键词: price-discrimination

摘要

Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that an increase to Medicaid's minimum drug rebate under the Affordable Care Act in 2010 lowered non-Medicaid drug spending by 2.5 percent. A stylized bargaining model shows that this is likely driven by the interaction of this reform with Medicaid's most-favored customer clause (MFCC). By examining the response of drugs that faced a change in incentives equivalent to the removal of Medicaid's MFCC, we estimate that removing the Medicaid MFCC would have reduced overall 2010 non-Medicaid drug spending by an additional 3.5 percent, though it would have likely also increased Medicaid spending.