Agglomeration, Misallocation, and (the Lack of) Competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brooks, Wyatt J.; Kaboski, Joseph P.; Li, Yao Amber
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame; National Bureau of Economic Research; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20180443
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 483-519
• 关键词: Collusion; industry; markups; spillovers; insurance; GROWTH; MARKET; RISK

摘要

Industrial agglomeration policies may limit competition. We develop, validate, and apply a novel approach for measuring competition based on the comovement of markups and market shares among firms in the same location and industry. Then we develop a model of how this reduction in competition affects aggregate income. We apply our approach to the well-known special economic zones (SEZs) of China. We estimate that firms in SEZs exhibit cooperative pricing almost three times as intensively as firms outside SEZs. Nevertheless, we model the aggregate consequences of SEZs and find positive effects because markups become higher but also more equal.