Sustainable Shadow Banking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ordonez, Guillermo
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20150346
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 33-56
• 关键词: Financial innovation; capital regulation; leverage cycles; equilibria; CONTRACTS; RISK

摘要

Banking regulation is beneficial because it constrains banks' portfolios to prevent excessive risk taking. But given that regulators usually know less than a bank about its investment opportunities, regulation comes at the cost of foregoing profitable investments. I argue that shadow banking improves welfare because it provides a channel to escape excessive regulation that is asymmetrically more valuable for banks with access to efficient investment opportunities. I propose a novel intervention that improves welfare further by taxing shadow activities, subsidizing regulated activities and allowing banks to self-select into being regulated or not.