Automation, Bargaining Power, and Labor Market Fluctuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leduc, Sylvain; Liu, Zheng
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20220181
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 311-349
• 关键词: equilibrium unemployment; technological-change; cyclical behavior; skill; decline; robots; MODEL; rise

摘要

We argue that the threat of automation weakens workers' bargaining power in wage negotiations, dampening wage adjustments and amplifying unemployment fluctuations. We make this argument based on a business cycle model with labor market search frictions, generalized to incorporate automation decisions. In the model, procyclical automation threats create endogenous real wage rigidity that amplifies labor market fluctuations. The automation mechanism is consistent with empirical evidence. It is also quantitatively important for explaining the large volatilities of unemployment and vacancies relative to that of real wages, a puzzling observation through the lens of standard business cycle models. ( JEL E13, E24, E32, J31, J63, J64)